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Non-technical summary
Declining labour shares in a large number of countries, particularly in continental Eu-
rope, have renewed the academic and political debate about the factors which explain
these downward trends. While the share accruing to labour in the division of national
income was long being seen as constant over time, this stylised fact has recently been
challenged. Several explanations for temporal and persistent movements of the labour
share have been brought forward in the debate: effects of structural and technological
change, influences of globalisation and increased product market integration, and the
importance of institutional settings, often with a focus on wage bargaining structures.
The aim of this paper is to take a structured empirical approach at assessing the
relative importance of those factors across countries. In particular, we focus on proper
dynamic model specification and test the validity of the homogeneity assumption of slope
coefficients frequently implied in previous studies. We employ fixed effect estimators as
well as pooled mean group and mean group estimators, the latter two in a dynamic
heterogeneous panel framework.
In a sample of OECD countries, we find negative effects for two explanatory variables
of the labour share: the capital output ratio and trade openness. Furthermore, we are
not able to reject the homogeneity assumption on the slope coefficients. This first finding
lends important support to the standard theory on labour share movements. However,
as far as other explanatory variables often found in the literature go, the picture is more
mixed. Total factor productivity, in particular, is found to exert heterogeneous effects
across countries and no clear support for the pooling assumption of slope coefficients in
a linear dynamic model is found.
In order to add more detail to our analysis and to address the role of institutional
arrangements, in particular with respect to the bargaining process, we split the sample
into two groups of countries characterised by differently strong unions. We find impor-
tant differences in the coefficient values and levels of significance. For more market-
oriented countries with lower union density, we see the labour share being driven down
by variables capturing technological change and shifts in the relative usage of factors of
production. For countries with strong unions, however, we find trade openness to be
the most relevant explanatory factor for downward movements of the labour share. We
conclude this is due to trade openness reducing the possibilities of unionised employees
to secure a wage markup in the distribution of factor incomes.
Das Wichtigste in Kürze
Eine stetig fallende Arbeitseinkommensquote (AEQ), gerade in Kontinentaleuropa, hat
das Interesse sowohl der Politik als auch der akademischen Forschung in dieses Maß
makroökonomischer Verteilungsgrechtigkeit erneuert. Während die Forschung die AEQ
lange als über die Zeit konstant angesehen hat, wird dieses makroökonomische "Faktum"
immer mehr in Frage gestellt. Die Debatte hat in den letzten Jahren vielfältige Gründe
für ein Absinken der AEQ zu Tage gefördert: Einflüsse des Strukturwandels und des
technologischen Fortschritts, Globalisierungstendenzen und die institutionelle Struktur
eines Landes - gerade mit Blick auf den Lohnverhandlungsprozess.
Ziel dieser Studie ist es, empirisch zu analysieren, welche Faktoren in welchen Län-
dern tatsächlich für die angesprochenen Trends verantwortlich sind. Im Detail richten
wir den Fokus auf eine korrekte dynamische Spezifikation des Schätzmodells und da-
rauf die Annahme der Gleichheit des Einflusses einzelner Faktoren zu testen, welche
vielen Studien zum Thema innewohnt. Hierfür verwenden wir sogenannte "fixed effects",
"pooled mean group" und "mean group" Schätzer. Letztere vereinen Heterogenität und
Dynamik in einem Panel-Rahmen.
Für viele OECD Länder finden wir negative Effekte für zwei wichtige erklärende Vari-
ablen: Das Kapital-Output Verhältnis und die Handelsoffenheit eines Landes. Darüber-
hinaus können wir für diese Variable die Homogenitätsannahme nicht verwerfen. Dieses
wichtige empirische Ergebnis liefert bedeutende Unterstützung für theoretische Ansätze
zur Erklärung der AEQ. Andere, häufig in der Literatur verwendete Variablen, liefern
ein weniger klares Bild. Gerade der Einfluss der totalen Faktorproduktivität scheint sehr
heterogen über die Länder im Datensatz verteilt zu sein.
Um weitere Aussagen bezüglich der Wirkung institutioneller Rahmenbedingungen,
insbesonere bezüglich des Lohnsetzungsprozesses, zu treffen, teilen wir unseren Daten-
satz in zwei Ländergruppen. Wir unterscheiden einerseits Länder mit starken und
andererseits Länder mit schwächeren Gewerkschaften. Hieraus ergeben sich wichtige
Unterschiede in der Wirkung einzelner Variablen. Für eher markt-orientierte Länder
führen wir Veränderungen in der AEQ auf technologischen Wandel und Veränderungen
im Faktoreinsatzverhältnis zurück. Für Länder, in denen Gewerkschaften eine starke
Rolle einnehmen, zeigt sich die Handelsoffenheit als hauptverantwortlich. Hier scheinen
die Gewerkschaften in einer globalisierten Welt weniger in der Lage, ihre Macht im
Verteilungsprozess durchzusetzen.
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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to take a structured approach at estimating the coefficients
of factors explaining movements of the labour share across countries. In particular,
we focus on proper dynamic specification and test the validity of the homogeneity
assumption of slope coefficients frequently implied in previous studies. We employ
fixed effect estimators as well as pooled mean group and mean group estimators,
the latter in a dynamic heterogeneous panel framework.
We find support for a dynamic estimation setup and derive statements regarding
the homogeneity assumption with respect to the three most prominent explanatory
variables in the literature: the capital-output ratio, total factor productivity and
trade openness. In addition, we take account of different institutional arrangements
across countries.
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1 Introduction
The share accruing to labour in the division of national income is one of the classi-
cal topics of macroeconomics. However, it lay dormant for decades—assumed away
in standard macroeconomic treatments as constant and straightforwardly derived from
a Cobb-Douglas production function. This constancy of the labour share has recently
been challenged and with it one of the stylized facts in macroeconomics. Declining labour
shares in a large number of countries, particularly in continental Europe, have brought
the topic back onto the political agenda - often accompanied by passionate discussions
about implied inequality concerns. To put it shortly: It seems as if the labour share is
making an impressive comeback.1
Figure 1 clearly shows the source of concern: For a sample of OECD countries, the
labour share has on average declined by roughly seven percentage points since 1980.
For individual countries the picture is similar. All countries in the sample individually
report a decline except for the United States where the labour share has nearly remained
constant.2
Figure 1: The average labour share in a sample of OECD countries
1See Atkinson (2009) and the references therein for a re-appraisal.
2See section 4 for descriptive statistics, details on the sample and the computation of variables.
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In the face of labour shares declining almost in parallel across a vast majority of
developed countries, several recent studies try uncovering the underlying forces and pos-
sible implications. The strands of arguments may roughly be grouped into the following
segments: effects of structural and technological change, influences of globalisation and
increased product market integration, and the importance of institutional settings, often
with a focus on wage bargaining structures.
The effects of changes in relative factor inputs in production and technological change
are most prominently discussed in Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003). They show that the
impact of changes in relative factor inputs and factor prices can be comprehensively
modelled via the capital output ratio. The direction of the impact on the labour share
then depends on the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital. With the
two factors being substitutes, the labour share declines with an increase in the capital
output ratio. As far as technological change is concerned, they show that only capital
augmenting technological change has the potential to shift the capital output schedule
and create long-term downward pressure on the labour share. A recent contribution by
Arpaia et al. (2009) extends this model to incorporate different skill categories of labour
to highlight the important issue of capital-skill complementarity.
In recent work, globalisation took center stage as the most likely candidate among
many explanatory factors in the analysis of declining labour shares all over continental
Europe and beyond. Numerous studies have analysed the effects of greater trade in-
tegration on factor shares. In general, it is argued that greater trade openness exerts
downward pressure on the labour share either through Stolper-Samuelson-type relative
factor price effects or via power-shifts in the wage bargaining process. In the latter case
it is assumed that in more open economies the firm’s outside option improves relative to
that of employees if costs of relocating production or sourcing goods from spatially dif-
ferentiated locations are less than prohibitively high. Furthermore, stiffer international
competition can decrease mark-ups of firms, raising labour shares. An early study by
Harrison (2002) shows negative effects of increasing trade openness and occurences of
exchange rate crises for a large sample of developing and developed countries. Jaumotte
and Tytell (2007) add further measures of globalisation including immigration and also
establish a negative link. However, the effect of increased trade openness also features a
certain degree of heterogeneity with respect to time, regional aspects and measurement.
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Guscina (2006) stresses that the effect is significant in the most recent two and a half
decades only; Buch et al. (2008) show that Italian regions are differently affected than
German ones; and Hutchinson and Persyn (2009) develop more sophisticated measures
of trade openness that render the effect insignificant.
Besides globalisation, labour market institutions are frequently brought up as ex-
planatory factors in the quest for uncovering the mechanisms of factor share dynamics.
Checchi and Garcia-Peñalosa (2008) point to potentially heterogeneous effects of insti-
tutions on the labour share and stress the importance of empirically determining the
direction of the overall effect. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) emphasize the intertem-
poral aspect of such institutions. They propose that in the short run institutions which
increase the bargaining power of workers could lift the labour share, while the same in-
stitutions could set the labour share off on a declining track when employers substitute
capital for relatively more expensive labour in the long-run. Most studies with a focus
on globalisation also integrate into the analysis aspects of labour market institutions.
We contribute to the inspiring research outlined above and by stressing two points:
dynamics and cross-country heterogeneity in estimated slope coefficients. The first point
has so far mostly been addressed in a rather ad-hoc manner by simply including the
dependent variable as a one period-lag. Yet, as Pesaran and Smith (1995) have shown,
there is considerable danger in blind trust in pooled dynamic models. In such models,
severely biased estimates could be the results of data best described by heterogeneous
slope-coefficients across sample units, i.e. if the effects of certain variables differ across
countries in our case. Therefore we apply estimators which allow us to directly test
the homogeneity assumption of all slope-coefficients inherent in most previous studies.
Assessing heterogeneity furthermore enables us to retrieve country specific insights into
the driving forces of movements in the labour share.
The idea of possibly heterogeneous slope coefficients is clearly valid; each of the
most prominent explanatory variables in studies on the labour share gives at least some
reason to doubt a uniform impact mechanism across countries. As stated above, this
also implies worries about potentially biased results in dynamic estimations.
The impact of the capital-output ratio has been shown by Bentolila and Saint-Paul
(2003) to be sector-dependent - crucially influenced by the sector’s elasticity of substitu-
tion between production factors. This in turn implies that different sectoral compositions
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of the economies in the sample could potentially introduce heterogeneity across countries
as well. However, the distribution of value added and employment across sectors is fairly
similar for the countries in our sample. This might limit the scope for heterogeneous
coefficients in this case.
The impact of Total Factor Productivity (TFP ) developments across countries may
also differ. This variable is mostly included in order to capture the nature of technological
change. This makes TFP a more or less suitable variable on a country-by-country basis
given the true nature of technological change may be different across countries.
Reason to doubt the cross-country homogeneity of the influence globalisation exerts
on the labour share particularly comes from the complex interaction of trade openness
and the production and employment structure in the respective countries. In addition, if
one assumes that increased openness puts labour at a general disadvantage in the wage
bargaining process, the country-specific institutional arrangements matter as well. Note
that for all these cases, should heterogeneity be indeed important, fixed effect methods
provide insufficient controls, since they merely account for the time-constant elements
of country specific characteristics and capture heterogeneity through differing intercepts
only.
However, it is not clear whether and to what degree this heterogeneity is indeed
important. It might not bias the results after all. For now, we merely state the possibility
and take it seriously in the estimation below. This is, we rely on technical methods to
check the validity of the pooling assumption implied in most econometric treatments
the literature offers. We test a basic model of the labour share consisting of the main
explanatory variables that surfaced in the literature. Yet, we do not restrict the influence
of those factors to be homogeneous across countries. We estimate the driving forces of
labour share fluctuations in a dynamic heterogeneous panel framework. Particularly, we
employ the pooled mean group (PMG) estimator and the mean group (MG) estimator
as in Pesaran et al. (1999) and Pesaran and Smith (1995), respectively. The PMG
estimator represents a dynamic pooled model with a homogeneity restriction on all
long-run coefficients, which are in the focus of our analysis. The MG estimator explicitly
allows for slope-heterogeneity in those long-run coefficients in contrast to mere intercept
or short-run heterogeneity. Therefore, it provides the basis for direct tests on the validity
of the pooling assumption which we carefully discuss. More generally, our estimates serve
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as a robustness check of the results previously brought forward in the literature, since we
also employ standard fixed-effects estimators and compare the results to our preferred
specifications.
Note that our aim is not to participate in the quest for further possible explanatory
variables, but to take a structured approach at assessing the relevance and importance
of those factors that can be seen as fairly established in the literature. We believe that a
thorough treatment of dynamics and possible country specific impacts could shed further
light on the development of the labour share.
This paper is organised as follows: The section following this introduction briefly
outlines the theoretical framework and clarifies the predicted impacts of our explanatory
variables. In section 3 the theoretical model is transformed into an estimation setup and
the empirical strategy is explained. The estimators are introduced and their suitability
and particular use are carefully discussed. Section 4 reports sources and computations
of the data while section 5 presents the results of our econometric exercises. A final
section concludes.
2 Theoretical background
The goal of this section is to motivate, in a way consistent with theory, the explanatory
variables that are assumed to affect the labour share (LS). We mostly build on Bentolila
and Saint-Paul (2003). They show that movements in the labour share can in general be
explained in terms of three different channels. First they show the capital output ratio
k = K/Y to, under certain assumptions, comprehensively explain movements of the
labour share triggered by effects such as changes in wages or factor shares in production.
Secondly, they show that certain departures from the original assumptions can shift this
relationship. Thirdly, they provide guiding theory for cases in which the economy is
put off the schedule defined by the relationship between k and LS. We follow their
theoretical insights and briefly introduce each case.
The capital output ratio as a simple but comprehensive determinant of fluctuations
of the labour share emerges irrespective of a strict functional form. As long as firms
produce under constant returns to scale, labour and capital are the sole inputs, labour
markets are perfectly competitive and technological progress is not capital augmenting,
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the labour share can be expressed as a function of k, LS = g(k). This encompasses
all changes in wages, interest rates, factor inputs or labour augmenting technological
change as long as the above assumptions are maintained. The direction of the effects on
the labour share then depends on the elasticity of substitution. It can be shown, that a
higher k only lowers the labour share if the factors are substitutes, i.e. δLS/δk < 0 only
if the elasticity of substitution is greater than one.
If the assumption on the nature of technological progress is lifted and capital aug-
menting technological change is allowed for, changes in k are no longer a sufficient expla-
nation for labour share movements. Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) show that capital
augmenting technological change shifts the curve described by g(k) in a multiplicative
way. This means that the original relationship is preserved and a change in factor prices
or inputs moves the labour share following the same mechanism as above, but it does
so at a different level of LS which is determined by the size of the factor bias inherent
in capital augmenting technological change. At this point it is enough to note that now
LS = g(k,A) with A representing capital augmenting technological change.
A second possibility for deviations from the original, purely k-based, relationship are
non-competitive features in the product or labour market. If factors are not paid their
marginal product, the economy moves off the schedule derived under the strict set of
assumptions above. Consider for example a situation in which bargaining takes place over
wages and assume that the process can be modeled in an efficient bargaining context.
Then, the labour share is affected by the relative bargaining power of employers and
employees. Following the literature, we consider trade openness an important indicator
of relative bargaining power. If trade openness is a valid approximation for an economy’s
integration into world markets and its cost of access to the latter, the value of the outside
option of firms in the bargaining process increases with openness. Thus, the labour share
is negatively affected. It is interesting to note, that trade openness can affect the labour
share in numerous ways. If trade triggers Stolper-Samuelson-type effects, those should
be captured by the g(k) schedule, since they imply simple changes in factor inputs and
prices. Trade openness could also act as competition enhancing, driving down mark-ups
of firms via reducing their market power. For now, we consider the impact and sign
of the coefficient of trade openness an empirical issue and postpone further details to
later sections. At this point we simply state a general relationship for the labour share
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as LS = g(k,A)h(X) with X standing for all possible "shift factors" driving a wedge
between the marginal product of labour and the real wage. We assume h(.) to have an
exponential form.
In the estimations detailed in section 5, we allow for all the above cases by including
the variables most commonly used in the literature. We directly control for the capital
output ratio and allow for the possibility of capital augmenting technological change by
including an index of Total Factor Productivity. An important test will be to compare
the signs of the estimated coefficients on k and TFP . Only with the coefficients for k
and TFP being equally signed one can infer that technological change is indeed capital
augmenting. When assessing the impact of k, TFP and trade openness on the labour
share, we also allow for different institutional arrangements across countries.
Figure 2 summarises this section in a graphical framework based on Bentolila and
Saint-Paul (2003).
Figure 2: Theoretical influence on the labour share
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3 Empirical Framework
The aim of the remaining sections is to test the explanatory power of the outlined
theory. To this end, we have to chose suitable estimators among the many that panel
econometrics, in particular for macro panel data, offer. Two principles guide us through
this selection process. The first principle is that we take serious account of cross-sectional
heterogeneity in the data, i.e. we carefully deal with the question whether to employ
pooled or country-specific estimators in order to receive reliable empirical results. The
second principle is the preference of estimators based on dynamic rather than static
models since our objective is not only to explain cross-country differences in the labour
shares but also to gauge the persistence in the evolution over time.
Obeying to the second principle is straightforward by considering an autoregressive
distributed lag (ARDL)-Model as in Pesaran et al. (1999)
yit =
p∑
j=1
λijyit−j +
q∑
j=0
δ′ijxit−j + µi + it (1)
in which yit represents country i’s observation on the logarithm of the labour share
in period t and xit−j is the vector of the explanatory variables. Slope coefficients to be
estimated are given by λij and δ′ij and µi is a time-invariant fixed effect. The indices
run from t = 1, . . . T and i = 1, . . . N .
By reparameterisation the following error-correction representation of (1) emerges
∆yit = −φiyit−1 − β′ixit +
p−1∑
j=1
λ∗ij∆yit−j +
q−1∑
j=0
δ∗
′
ij∆xit−j + µi + it (2)
where φi = (1 −∑pj=1 λij), βi = ∑qj=0 δij , λ∗ij = −∑pm=j+1 λim, j = 1, . . . , p − 1 and
δ∗ij = −
∑q
m=j+1 δim, j = 1, . . . , q − 1.
These two equations suffice for organising ideas and for demonstrating the parameter
restrictions inherent to the estimators we look at.
3.1 Consistency versus efficiency
To begin with, we consider the static fixed effects (FE) estimator which is still the
model of choice in many empirical studies, in particular the ones that seek to estimate
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the determinants of the labour share. In terms of our model, the FE estimator imposes
the following parameter restrictions
λij = 0 ∀i, j (3)
δ′ij = 0 ∀j > 1 and ∀i (4)
δi1 = δ1 ∀i (5)
and it is evident that such a model may easily be rejected by the data: it implies
no delayed effects from the endogenous and explanatory variables and the only source
of cross-country heterogeneity is attributed to the country fixed-effect µi. The FE esti-
mator, however, is adequate if the long-run response of the labour share is indeed best
captured by the cross-country variation in the data and if dynamic effects are negligible.
Contrary to this, if heterogeneity between countries dominates then the data is more
appropriately explained by a set of country-by-country regressions. In this case, the
overall effect in the panel may be summarised by computing the Mean Group (MG)
estimator of Pesaran and Smith (1995). The MG estimator is the simple average of
the country-specific slope estimates and proven to be a consistent parameter estimator
if slope coefficients are heterogeneous and N and T are sufficiently large. Since the
interest is on the long-run effects, the MG estimator computes θMG = 1N
∑N
i=1
−βˆi
φˆi
,
where we obtain βˆi and φˆi from N individual unrestricted regressions of equation (2).
An alternative procedure that brings a balance between the strongly restricted FE
estimator and the fully heterogeneous MG estimator is given by the Pooled Mean Group
(PMG) framework of Pesaran et al. (1999). Taking equation (2) as reference, the PMG
estimator imposes the following homogeneity restrictions
βi = β ∀i. (6)
The PMG estimator restricts the long-run parameters to be the same across coun-
tries but leaves the parameters concerning the error correction coefficients φi and the
coefficients of the short-run dynamics unrestricted. The set of long-run parameters that
maximises the concentrated likelihood function belonging to the panel data model gives
the PMG estimator βPMG.
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If homogeneity of the β-parameters holds, then the PMG estimator is consistent
and efficient, whereas the MG estimator is only consistent. Likewise, if the model is
homogeneous and dynamic responses are absent, then the FE estimator is preferable in
terms of efficiency. Principally, in choosing among the FE, MG and PMG estimators
we face a trade-off between consistency and efficiency. From the outset it is not clear
which estimator accurately measures the relationships between the labour share and its
determinants. Theory suggests that there might be both heterogenous and homogeneous
causes for the parallel movement in the labour shares, but in order to clarify which
explanatory variable exerts what effect, we employ Hausman specification tests to check
whether homogeneous or heterogeneous parameter estimates are consistent with the
observered data.
3.2 Cross-sectional dependence
So far we have been silent on the assumptions about the error terms it in equation (1)
and (2). The standard FE, MG and PMG estimation framework assumes that the distur-
bances it are independently distributed across i and t. A more reasonable assumption is
that countries are cross-correlated due to international linkages and common influences
such as common macroeconomic shocks. Neglecting such dependencies yields inefficient
parameter estimates and is likely to lead to size distortions of conventional tests of sig-
nificance. A convenient way to incorporate cross-sectional dependence in our framework
is to model such dependencies by a factor error structure. Under this assumption, the
errors of equation (2) are given by
it = γift + eit (7)
in which ft is a unobserved common effect and eit are independently distributed
country-specific errors. Such an empirical specification seems to be more in line with a
model of the labour share featuring technological change as an important determining
variable that may comprise common components across countries.
Pesaran (2006) shows that, in principle, directly augmenting the panel model with a
set of cross-sectional averages of all variables can capture the correlated error component.
However, considering the large time series dimension of such an approach, following
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Binder and Bröck (2006) we pursue a more parsimonious specification which results in
conducting a two-step procedure when estimating equation (8). The basic insight that
lies behind the common correlated effects estimator developed in Pesaran (2006) is that
a proxy for the unobserved common factor can be obtained as
fˆt = ∆yt + φ̂yt − β̂′xt −
p−1∑
j=1
λ̂∗j∆yt−j −
q−1∑
j=1
δ̂∗j
′∆xt−j (8)
in which bar variables denote cross-sectional averages à la •t = ∑Ni=1 •it and hatted
coefficients are from a first step estimation of
∆yt = −φyt − β′xt +
p−1∑
j=1
λ∗j∆yt−j +
q−1∑
j=1
δ∗j
′∆xt−j + εt (9)
In a second step, we replace ft from (7) with fˆt from (8) and estimate the error-
correction model as shown by equation (2) with the help of this factor estimate.
4 Data
This section describes the data and provides details on the calculations of all variables
used in the next section’s estimations. The labour share of income is one of the most
classical measures in macroeconomics, yet, it is not uniquely defined. We use data pro-
vided in the "total economy database" (TED) where the labour share is defined as total
labour compensation (LAB) divided by gross value added (VA): LSit = LABit/V Ait.3
It is important to note that labour compensation contains an imputed labour income of
the self-employed, thereby providing a better cross-country comparability as stressed by
Gollin (2002).
The capital output ratio k is calculated with capital stock data from the EU’s Ameco
database as the net capital stock in year t over GDP in the same year.4 Total factor
productivity (tfp)data is also taken from TED. Trade openness is calculated as the sum
of imports and exports divided by GDP with data from the OECD Economic Outlook
database. In order to capture different institutional settings, in particular with respect
3This database is available at http://www.ggdc.net/databases/ted.htm
4This database is available at
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/db_indicators8646_en.htm. Data for Germany
prior to 1991 are calculated based on capital stock growth rates for West Germany.
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to the bargaining process, we characterize countries as either having strong unions or
weak ones using union density as the principal measures. These data are provided by
and described in Visser (2009). All data are at yearly frequency. Table 1 shows summary
statistics for our resulting balanced sample of 15 OECD countries over 25 years (1982 -
2006).
The descriptive statistics again clarify the downward movement of labour shares
across almost every country in the sample, with the United States being the only excep-
tion. At the same time countries have become more open and experienced substantial
increases in Total Factor Productivity. The assessment is less clear with regard to the
capital output ratio, which has increased for some and decreased for others. In addition,
union density is now lower than in the 1980s for all countries except Belgium and Fin-
land.
While the descriptive statistics point to some interesting relationships between variables,
it remains for the next section to establish significant links between the labour share and
its driving forces.
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5 Results
With the empirical strategy in place, we can proceed to describing the results and their
interpretations in this section. Table 2 shows alternative estimates of the ARDL model of
the labour share. The short-run dynamics of the PMG and MG models have been spec-
ified with the aid of the Akaike information criterium where we allowed for a maximum
lag of order one.
For the log of the capital output ratio ln(k) = ln(K/Y ) the coefficient is negative for
all three estimated models - FE, PMG and MG. However, a large (heteroscedasticity-
corrected) standard error renders the FE estimator insignificant. According to theory,
the negative coefficient sign hints to an average economy-wide elasticity of substitution
larger than one, pointing to labour and capital being substitutes. The PMG and MG esti-
mates are also in line with other estimates in the literature as, for example, in Hutchinson
and Persyn (2009) or Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003). More importantly, the MG esti-
mate seems broadly in line with its pooled counterparts, suggesting the validity of the
pooling assumption in this case - a point emphasised by a Hausman test, which takes the
value of .94 and therefore does not reject the homogeneity of coefficients across the PMG
and MG specifications according to the critical value of the χ2(1) distribution. A similar
picture emerges with regard to Total Factor Productivity. Estimated coefficients are
negative. Theory tells us that equally signed coefficients for ln(k) and ln(TFP ) reveal
technological progress to be capital augmenting (Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003)). Given
that the MG turns out to be insignificant, the homogeneity assumption of the ln(TFP )
coefficient is questionable. We pointed out above that technological developments in the
OECD countries are very similar. However, technological change seems to influence the
labour share quite heterogeneously across countries. This can be seen clearly in figure
5 were country-specific deviations from the MG coefficient estimates are shown. The
individual slope estimates for the ln(TFP ) variable scatter quite a lot around the MG
estimate. For several countries the ln(TFP ) coefficient is even positive which suggests
that—given the negative sign of the capital/output coefficient— technological progress
is neither labour- nor capital augmenting (Australia, Austria, Ireland and the US).
Individual slope estimates of the trade openness variable also fluctuate around the MG
counterpart but to a lesser extent. However, we cannot reject the homogeneity assump-
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Table 2: Estimates based on the full country-sample
FE PMG MG
ln(k) -0.169 -0.305∗∗∗ -0.299∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.055) (0.093)
ln(TFP ) -0.448∗∗∗ -0.435∗∗∗ -0.257
(0.123) (0.059) (0.153)
Trade Openness -0.097∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ -0.160∗
(0.041) (0.022) (0.086)
Notes: ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ denotes significance to the 1%/5%/10% level, respectively, according
to the two-sided critical values of the Student’s t distribution. Figures in brackets are
the standard errors which are corrected for possible heteroscedasticity in the case of
the FE estimates.
tion on the estimated coefficients based on Hausman tests. Returning to table 2, we
find trade openness to negatively and significantly affect the labour share in all three
specifications.
We furthermore note that a dynamic specification is preferable over a static one given
that for all country specific models at least two of the variables are significant in contem-
poraneous values as well as when included with one lag. There is not a single country
for which the labour share is best described by a static model.
While our results from table 2 establish a decent benchmark, they leave out one im-
portant aspect that features in nearly all papers on the topic: institutional arrangements,
in particular with relevance for the wage bargaining process. Therefore, we comply with
other studies and test whether institutional settings influence our estimates. However,
we proceed in a different fashion with respect to the precise way of accounting for institu-
tions. We do not directly include institutional variables in the estimation but divide the
sample and test for the stability of the other variable’s coefficients in the split samples.
Note that an approach using the full sample and an interaction term is not feasable when
employing the MG estimator. Directly including measures for the relative strength in
the bargaining process is not an option either; this is for the following reasons: (i) we
need a sufficient amount of variation in the variables over time; (ii) our time series based
estimation approach does not allow to estimate models with many variables; and (iii)
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Notes: Dots show the individual estimates of the long-run coefficients. The solid line indicates the MG
estimate. Dotted lines denote MG estimates +/- 2-times the standard error.
Figure 3: Individual vs. MG estimates
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Table 3: Country groupings
High union density Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Sweden
Low union density Australia, France, UK, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, US, Canada
institutional proxies are typically plagued by measurement error, which would result in
biased point estimates.
In the following, we divide our sample into two country groups according to whether
they can be described as having high or low union density and redo the estimations.
Union density tells us the percentage of the workforce that is member of a union. We
define countries that fall into the high union density group if their average value is above
the cross-sectional median over the period from 1982 to 2006. Table 3 shows the country
groupings based on this classification scheme.
One point deserves further discussion. Researchers often face a choice between var-
ious measures for the unionisation of a country. In particular a choice between union
density and union coverage. The latter gives the share of employees covered by wage
agreements and paid accordingly - irrespective of direct union membership. While it
is generally difficult to decide in favour of either union density or union coverage to be
included in a model, we prefer union density in our setup. We believe union density
has stronger implications for the bargaining power of employees. For a union’s clout in
labour conflicts it is of crucial importance how many actual members it has since this
directly determines the finances available through membership fees and the manpower
in strikes and lockouts.5
A general and not surprising result emerging from table 3 is that the Anglo-Saxon
countries are characterised by low unionisation relative to the sample median and that
the Continental European, in particular the Scandinavian countries have relatively strong
union membership shares in total employment. Thus, the following “sample split” ex-
ercise can, with some exceptions, also be seen as a crude comparison of differences in
labour share influences between the English speaking world and Continental Europe.
Turning to the results if we split the sample according to union density (table 4) we
5Using union coverage to divide the two groups yield a largely similar grouping.
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Table 4: Estimates based on union density country groupings
High union density Low union density
FE PMG MG FE PMG MG
ln(k) -0.194 -0.756∗∗∗ -0.268 -0.221∗ -0.370∗∗∗ -0.391∗∗∗
(0.143) (0.115) (0.196) (0.125) (0.079) (0.123)
ln(TFP ) -0.516∗∗∗ -0.795∗∗∗ -0.175 -0.395∗∗∗ -0.536∗∗∗ -0.500∗∗∗
(0.178) (0.095) (0.305) (0.135) (0.079) (0.147)
Trade Openness -0.095∗ -0.278∗∗∗ -0.287∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗ -0.007 -0.018
(0.055) (0.055) (0.087) (0.031) (0.036) (0.096)
See notes to above tables.
find that poolability of slope coefficients for the capital/output (ln(k)) and the ln(TFP )
variable seems not warranted for the countries that are classified as having high union
density. Pooled Mean Group estimates of both slope coefficients are significant, but
insignificant Mean Group estimates point to large cross-country variations in those esti-
mates. In contrast, all three estimates for the trade openness coefficient turn out to be
significantly negative. Furthermore, a Hausman test does not reject the null hypothesis
of poolability for this latter variable. In comparison to the full sample estimates, the
MPG and MG estimates of trade openness are approximately twice as high in absolute
value.
Findings for the low union density countries show some interesting differences. First,
FE, PMG and MG estimates for ln(k) and ln(TFP ) are negative and significant. PMG
and MG estimates are similar and a Hausman test does not reject poolabilty of the ln(k)
and ln(TFP ) coefficients. Secondly, trade openness does not seem to influence the labor
share in the low union density countries since both the PMG and MG coefficients are
not significantly different from zero. This casts doubt on the negative and significant
static FE estimate.
It is important to discuss the results reported in table 4 in comparison to our findings
for the full sample estimates. Remember that we do not reject the poolability hypothesis
for ln(k) based on the full sample estimates shown in table 2, but we do reject the same
hypothesis for the high union density countries. Similarly, we find poolable coefficients
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for trade openness in the full sample, but not in the low union density country group.
This discrepancy can be explained twofold: on a more technical point it must be noted
that the MG estimator is particularly vulnerable to outliers as it simply computes the
average of the country-specific slope estimates. Consequently, its precision increases
with N , the cross-sectional dimension. Given that our sample split estimates are based
on rather small subgroups, insignificant MG estimates may simply reflect small sample
problems of the MG approach which in turn leads to a rejection of the poolability
hypothesis. A second explanation brings us back to one of our main concerns, namely the
treatment of cross-sectional heterogeneity. The question whether to pool or not to pool
is naturally linked to the sample under consideration. If we allow for more homogeneity
within a given sample as we do when countries are pre-grouped by a certain homogeneity
criterion (union density), we would regard tests on the poolability of parameters as more
powerful than in a sample with relatively heterogeneous countries. In this respect, the
findings on poolability and non-poolability of parameters in the split sample may be
preferred over those from the relatively heterogeneous full sample.
The upshots of the analysis that takes the influence of wage bargaining institutions
into account are the following: First, for the countries with low unionisation (or low
institutional bargaining power of employees) we find a high degree of homogeneity with
respect to influences on the labour share through the capital output ratio and tech-
nological progress. Furthermore, the trade channel seems to have no role in affecting
the relative compensation of employees in these countries. Secondly, for the countries
that are classified as having powerful employees in the bargaining process, the picture is
more mixed. However, there is more evidence that the trade channel is more important
and may exert more downward pressure on the labour share than in countries with less
influential employee institutions.
To bring theory and the empirical findings together, recall our above considerations
with respect to how trade affects the labour share. We argued that the trade channel
not picked up elsewhere is the possible power shift in the wage bargaining process. Now
assume that any given change in trade openness might exert a heterogeneous effect across
countries if there are different institutional arrangements. Our results point to stronger
negative trade effects in countries with relatively many union members. A possible
explanation for that finding may be the following. In countries where the bargaining
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power of employees is already low, or the wage setting process is simply not characterised
by bargaining but by market forces instead, employees do not suffer a loss in relative
compensation when the bargaining power of the employer increases, for instance due to
an increase in a firm’s outside option. Put simply, if there is no union wage markup,
the labour share is not vulnerable to shifts in relative bargaining power. In countries
where the labour share was held at a higher level through strong unions, international
cost competition and easier access of firms to the world’s labour supply brought down
the labour share.
For the sample characterised by low union density, we also find the impact of the
capital output ratio and the Total Factor Productivity to be poolable and to exert
negative and visible influences. This may well hint at a stronger influence of technological
change in those countries. Adjustments in relatives shares of factors used in production
could be swifter and the effect of capital-augmenting technological change is visible in
the labour share’s development. In the other countries, an organised workforce might
better be able to shield itself from the forces of technological change. Yet, as argued
above, globalisation makes this an ever more difficult task.
The above results emphasize the virtues of caution in the interpretation of the driving
forces of the labour share. Even if one cannot technically reject the pooling assumption
for empirical models of the labour share, this does not rule out important differences in
the effects across countries or groups of countries.
6 Conclusion
The initial motivation for this paper was to shed some light on the key driving forces
underlying the downward movement in labour shares across a variety of countries. More
precisely, it was about assessing whether the explanatory variables exert the same influ-
ences in all countries; we wanted to test the pooling assumption on slope-homogeneity
implied by almost all existing studies on the topic. For this purpose, we estimated the
determinants of labour share movements with standard fixed effects models as well as in
a dynamic heterogeneous panel framework. The latter allowed us to employ estimators
which differ in their assumptions on slope-homogeneity and to subsequently compare
the results. Based on those PMG and MG estimators we find the pooling assumption
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to be valid for two variables - the capital output ratio and trade openness. This first
finding lends important support to the theory on labour share movements along the
lines of Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003). However, as far as other explanatory variables
often found in the literature go, the picture is more mixed. Total Factor Productivity,
in particular, is found to have heterogeneous slope coefficients across countries and no
clear support for the pooling assumption is found.
In order to add more detail to our analysis and to address the role of institutional ar-
rangements, we test for possible clusters among countries characterised by differently
strong unions from which we assume implications for the wage bargaining process. We
find important differences in the coeffcient values and levels of significance. For more
market-oriented countries with lower union density, we see the labour share being driven
by variables capturing technological change and shifts in the relative usage of factors of
production. For countries with strong unions, however, we find trade openness to be
the most relevant explanatory factor for downward movements of the labour share. We
conclude this is due to trade openness reducing the possibilities of unionised employees
to secure a wage markup in the distribution of factor incomes.
Given the above results, we conclude that further research as well as scientific policy ad-
vise should take possible slope-heterogeneity and institutional arrangements into account
when estimating models describing the labour share.
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